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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
UNPRECEDENTEDLY GAINS NEW GROUND IN
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. MISSISSIPPI
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the "public trust" doctrine gives each state the
power to control and manipulate the lands to which they have title,
which are certain waterways and lands, including coastlines, harbors,
bays and navigable rivers along with their non-navigable shores.' The
purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the public's rights to use these wa-
ters and lands.2 As a function of holding title, a state may convey the
property under certain circumstances to private individuals, but the
grantee's interest in the property remains subject to the public trust.3
Early public trust cases, at both the state and federal level, con-
cerned protection of the public's interest in navigable waters,4 because of
their importance to the public for purposes of fishing and other com-
merce. 5 Concerning non-navigable waters, in Shively v. Bowlby,6 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that states hold title to the non-
navigable shores of navigable tidal rivers; thus the state could include
1. Jampol, The Questionable Renaissance of the Tidelands Trust Doctrine in California,
13 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 6-8, 10-11 (1982). See infra note 16 and accompanying text for a basic
definition of the public trust doctrine. The public trust has historically encompassed the sea
and the seashore. Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Tradi-
tional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 (1970).
States do not automatically apply the public trust doctrine to all lands to which they have
title. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
2. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. RPv. 631, 633 (1986).
3. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). A state's ability to convey
its property is limited by the requirement that any conveyance or activity on the land be con-
sistent with the purposes of the public trust doctrine, or that the conveyance not substantially
infringe upon the public's rights. Id.; see also infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
4. The federal definition of navigable waters includes those waters that are "used or sus-
ceptible of being used" as "highways or channels for... commerce." United States v. Oregon,
295 U.S. 1, 15 (1934). The federal test of navigability determines to which waters and underly-
ing lands each state received title upon gaining statehood. Id. at 14. State law independently
determines which of the waters and underlying lands to which a state holds title are included
in the public trust, according to each state's own test of navigability; definition of the scope of
the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894). See
infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applicability of federal and
state law to the public trust doctrine.
5. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821);
see also infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
6. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
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such land within the public trust.7 Over the years, courts have consist-
ently followed the Shively definition of tidelands: those shore waters and
underlying lands between the high-tide and low-tide lines of navigable
waters.' This definition, however, has seldom included waters too small
in area to be navigable yet close enough to the ocean to be affected by the
daily flow of tides.9
Recently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,"0 the Supreme
Court extended radically the reach of the public trust doctrine to include
inland non-navigable tidelands. In Phillips, the Court held that the State
of Mississippi held title to all lands underneath waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, regardless of whether the waters were navigable.11
In reaching its holding, the Court deviated from its own precedents and
ignored well-settled state common law which had not included these
tidal waters within the public trust. 2 Moreover, the holding presages
significant, negative effects on the expectations of private landowners.
1 3
This Note analyzes the Court's reasoning in holding that states re-
ceived title to discrete, inland non-navigable tidelands and affirming the
Mississippi Supreme Court's application of the public trust doctrine to
these areas, against the backdrop of Roman law and English and Ameri-
can common law. The Note argues that in misinterpreting its prece-
dents, the Court has placed misguided emphasis on the old "ebb and
7. Id. at 51-52. No reference was made to those waters below the low-tide line, because
those waters were navigable, and therefore, unquestionably the state held title and could in-
clude these waters and lands within the public trust. Id.
8. Id. See, eg., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987); Ore-
gon ex reL State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
The ordinary definition of tidelands is "land between the lines of the ordinary high and
low tides, covered and uncovered successively by the ebb and flow [of the tide]." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (5th ed. 1979). Tidelands have been similarly defined as "land below
the mean high tide line" where the land is "covered and uncovered by the flux and reflux of the
tides." Jampol, supra note 1, at 6-7.
9. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 800 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text. Only New Jersey has asserted public
trust control over clearly non-navigable tidal waters. See infra notes 289-92 and accompany-
ing text.
10. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
11. Id. at 795. Phillips is the first case to hold that states have title to the distinct geo-
graphical area of land below discrete non-navigable tidal waters. See infra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
12. The Phillips Court acknowledged that none of its prior decisions had involved the type
of non-navigable tidal waters in question in this case. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 796; see also infra
notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
13. The expectations of private landowners may be adversely affected when a state decides
to assert title or exercise some degree of public trust control without any prior warning to the
landowner. See infra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
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flow" rule as the rule determining whether a state holds title in tidal
areas.14 Further, the Court's conclusion unadvisedly encourages states
to expand the physical scope of their public trust lands, now that the
Court has expanded the physical limits of the land to which the states
hold title. 5 Finally, this Note proposes that states employ a navigability-
based definition in determining which of its lands are subject to the pub-
lic trust, and urges states to cautiously expand the purposes for which
lands should be subject to the trust, rather than expand the doctrine's
physical scope to the extent that the Supreme Court decided that the
states' title extends.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The public trust doctrine developed from "the idea that certain
common properties, such as rivers, the seashore, and the air were held by
the government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the gen-
eral public." 16 This concept originated from the law of the Roman Em-
pire 7 in response to an increased need to protect coastal areas for fishing
and commerce. 18 Thus, the government could keep coastal areas, the
waterways and shores, open for public use by controlling the common
properties.
However, the Roman public trust doctrine did not absolutely pro-
tect public rights of use; the government could and did convey these
common areas, especially the shores, to private individuals, thereby ex-
tinguishing the public's rights.' 9 The doctrine developed similarly in
England that public rights existed, and further, that these rights would
be protected despite conveyance of waters and lands to private individu-
als.20 English law provided the basis for development of a public trust
doctrine in the American common law.2' The American common law,
14. See infra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
15. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 795.
16. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 163-64 (1971), quoted in Comment, Title,
Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 16 (1976).
The author provides an in-depth analysis of the development of the Roman, English, and
American common law regarding the public trust doctrine.
17. Comment, supra note 16, at 16; Comment, supra note 1, at 763; see also infra notes 23-
26 and accompanying text.
18. Comment, supra note 16, at 17.
19. Jampol, supra note 1, at 18; Comment, supra note 16, at 21; see also infra notes 28-29
and accompanying text.
20. Comment, supra note 16, at 48; see also infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
21. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 72-77 (1821). In Arnold, the New Jersey Court of Er-
rors and Appeals discussed in detail its interpretation of the English common law, and the
importance of English law in developing a public trust doctrine in New Jersey. Id.; see also
infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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in turn, focused on title to the public lands in question, as well as protec-
tion of public rights of use.22
A. Development of the Traditional Public Trust Doctrine
1. Roman law
Roman law developed the doctrine of a public trust for the purposes
of protecting the three basic concerns of the Roman Empire: commerce,
navigation and fishing. 3 Coastal areas became especially important as
commerce expanded throughout the Roman Empire, and thus the gov-
ernment had great interest in keeping coastal seas and waterways open
for public use and for navigational purposes.24 The Roman government
based its authority to protect public rights in these concerns on the best
known and most authoritative source of Roman law relative to public
rights in the sea and coastal areas-the Institutes of Justinian.25 The
Institutes described public rights as follows:
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea
.... Rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a
port, or in rivers are in common.... [T]he use of the banks is
as public as the rivers... [and] [t]he use of the sea-shore, as
well as of the sea, is also public[,] ... for the shores are not
understood to be property in any man, but are compared to the
sea itself.
26
This excerpt from the Institutes reflects the Roman viewpoint that
all persons had the right to open use of the sea and the seashore, because
these resources theoretically did not belong to any one person.27 Accord-
ing to the Institutes, Roman law specifically granted common rights to
the people in the seashores and rivers; however, Roman law also gave the
22. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 636.
23. Comment, supra note 16, at 21.
24. Id.; Jampol, supra note 1, at 17. The government used its power to keep navigable
waters open and free from obstruction from private individuals. Id.
The common rights granted by Roman law were not applied according to whether the
waterways were tidally influenced; public rights were granted to the people in waters that were
navigable in fact. Id. at 19.
25. J. INST. 2.1 (r. Cooper trans. 2d ed. 1841). The Institutes of Justinian were a sum-
mary of Roman case law as chronicled by Roman legal scholars. Comment, supra note 16, at
25. The Institutes of Justinian, codified in the 6th and 7th centuries A.D., have been translated
by many authors and have been cited in many articles as the definitive summary of Roman
law. See, e.g., Jampol, supra note 1, at 17; Comment, supra note 16, at 25-26; Comment, supra
note 1, at 763-64.
26. J. INST. 2.1.1-2.1.5, supra note 25, at 67-68.
27. Comment, supra note 16, at 21.
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government power to convey title in these lands-including full title to
the waterways-to private individuals for their exclusive use.28 Once the
government made an exclusive grant of particular land, public rights no
longer existed in the land or in the overlying waters.2 9 Thus, although
Roman law created the concept of a public trust doctrine, a real public
trust did not exist under Roman law because the public rights granted to
the people could be arbitrarily eliminated by a private grant from the
government.
2. English common law
In England, prior to the thirteenth century, the sea and seashores
were owned and controlled either by the King or by subjects to whom
the King granted exclusive ownership.3° Public rights in the sea and sea-
shore were not widely recognized, nor were public rights protected.31
However, in the thirteenth century the signing of the Magna Carta32 sig-
naled a recognition of public rights in the coastal areas to be protected by
the King.33 The provisions of the Magna Carta did not broadly proclaim
the existence of public rights.34 Instead, one provision merely prohibited
obstruction of navigable rivers. 35 Later, English law broadened the inter-
pretation of the Magna Carta as protecting public rights of navigation.36
Although the Magna Carta reasserted the King's dominion over all Eng-
28. Jampol, supra note 1, at 18-19 & n. 111. "Inhere were no restraints whatever imposed
by law on the power of the sovereign to convey public lands, including the sea and seashore."
Comment, supra note 16, at 32-33. The government had limitless powers of conveyance, be-
cause "[a]U such restraints were in fact made impossible by the basic premise of Roman law:
'That which pleases the Emperor has the force of law."' Id. at 33 (quoting J. INsT. 1.2.6).
In fact, the government often exclusively granted coastal lands to private individuals. Id.
29. According to Roman law, public rights existed as to the sea and seashore areas, as long
as these areas "were not yet appropriated to the use of anyone or allocated by the state."
Comment, supra note 16, at 29 (emphasis omitted); see also Jampol, supra note 1, at 18-19.
30. Comment, supra note 1, at 764-65.
31. Id. at 765. Private individuals owned most of the English seashore; they did not recog-
nize the public rights that had been introduced by Roman law. Id. Prior to the signing of the
Magna Carta, private individuals had much control over coastal areas. Comment, supra note
16, at 39.
32. The Magna Carta was "primarily a protest by the landed barons against infringements
of their property rights." Comment, supra note 16, at 39.
33. Id. The Magna Carta, which was written in the early thirteenth century and revised in
1225, has been described as "the original source of the public's rights in the coastal area." Id.;
see also Lazarus, supra note 2, at 635 n.16.
34. Comment, supra note 1, at 766-67.
35. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 33, reprinted in W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 343 (2d ed.
1958). This provision was designed to force removal of weirs, which were "permanent fishing
structures fixed to the bottom," from the rivers. Comment, supra note 1, at 766.
36. Comment, supra note 1, at 766. Interpretation of the Magna Carta was broadened
because "the common law... sought to broaden the public's interest." Id.
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lish lands,37 it did not strip private landowners of their land.38 Private
rights in land were recognized, as long as public rights of navigation were
not prejudiced by private ownership of land.39
The doctrine was primarily a result of England's dependence on the
sea for trade with foreign nations.' ° The Crown required open access to
the sea, which meant that access be kept open over navigable rivers-
those rivers that were influenced by the tide and big enough to support
commercial traffic.4 The doctrine was also influenced by the English
scholar Bracton, who in the mid-thirteenth century adopted the words of
the Institutes of Justinian,42 restating the principles that "[b]y natural
law these are common to all: running water, air, the sea, and the shores
of the sea, as though accessories of the sea."'  Bracton, however, ignored
the Roman principle disallowing private ownership in the seashore, 44 and
also ignored provisions of Roman law which protected common rights so
long as the seashores or rivers had not been conveyed to an individual.4"
Thus, early English common law developed a doctrine appearing to pro-
tect public rights in navigable waters and the seashore, regardless of
whether the land had been conveyed into private ownership.46
However, this preliminary public trust concept was not actually a
public trust. Under this early theory, the King did not have sovereign
title or control over all coastal lands and waterways.4 7 Private landown-
ers maintained title to navigable waters and underlying land granted to
37. Jampol, supra note 1, at 20.
38. Note, The Public Trust Doctrine." Accommodating the Public Need Within Constitu-
tional Bounds-Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988), 63 WASH. L. REv. 1087, 1090 (1988).
-39. Id.
40. Jampol, supra note 1, at 20.
41. Id. Navigable rivers were those influenced by the tide, for a practical reason:
Prior to the invention of the steam engine, the easiest, if not the only, efficient
method of navigating English rivers was by utilizing incoming tides to assist propul-
sion up rivers, and by following the recession of the tide in the opposite direction. As
a result, tidal rivers were the only navigable rivers, and the two were treated as one
with respect to the tidelands trust doctrine.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
42. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
43. 2 H. BRACroN, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne trans.
1968) (citing J. INsT. 2.1.1-2.1.5); see also Lazarus, supra note 2, at 635.
44. See supra text accompanying note 26.
45. Comment, supra note 16, at 36-37. Bracton did not entirely adopt the writings of
Justinian, because Roman law did not inalienably protect public rights, and Bracton was try-
ing to promulgate the concept that public rights existed in the land, whether held by the King
or by a private individual. Id. at 37.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. at 38-39.
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them by the King.4 8 Thus, while the public had certain rights of use,
there was no guarantee that the King could protect these rights against
infringement by private landowners.4 9
By the seventeenth century, further significant developments had oc-
curred in the English public trust doctrine. The theory developed that
the Crown had always held title to the seashore and to lands under
water, and that such land had not been conveyed to private landowners
unless specifically mentioned in the deed.50 Although this theory was
met with great outrage and was not enforced at that time,51 the jurist
Lord Hale relied on it in his own summary of the English common law.5 2
Hale's writings summarized the law of the coastal zone as follows:
[T]he king is the owner of [the sea], and as a consequent of his
propriety hath the primary right of fishing in the sea and the
creeks and arms thereof; yet the common people of England
have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms
thereof, as a publick common [right], and may not without in-
jury to their right be restrained of it, unless in such places or
creeks or navigable rivers, where either the king or some partic-
ular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common
liberty.
53
Hale also described the physical areas in which the King's rights existed,
including: (1) the "rivers that are arms of the sea"5 4 and (2) "the shore
of the sea... between the ordinary high-water and low-water mark."
55
48. Id. "[lit was never more than a theory... that all property in the kingdom originally
had been owned by the king." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 41. Most of the seashore had previously been conveyed to private landowners;
however, few deeds explicitly conveyed the land covered by water or affected by the tide. Id.
This theory was first propounded in the sixteenth century by Thomas Digges, a lawyer for
Queen Elizabeth, in order to recoup coastal lands from their private owners and sell them for
profit. Digges initially was unsuccessful in enforcing this theory against private owners; Eng-
lish courts later held that the sovereign held title to the seashore up to the high-water mark.
Id. at 42; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 635 n.19.
51. See supra note 50.
52. Hale's most famous writings are contained in M. HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS
ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM, reprinted in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHoRE 370 (3d
ed. 1888). Hale wrote his treatise in the seventeenth century, and it had great influence on
both English law and American common law. Comment, supra note 16, at 44; see Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1894).
53. S. MOORE, supra note 52, at 377; see also Comment, supra note 16, at 47.
54. S. MOORE, supra note 52, at 378.
55. Id. at 379. The King's dominion has also been described as including "all creeks, arms
of the sea," "tide-rivers," and "[a]l waters... within the flux and reflux of its tides." R.
HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CRowN, reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note 52, at 669
(emphasis omitted).
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Hale's writings suggested the possibility that public rights would not
be protected in a creek or river that the King had exclusively granted to a
private landowner. 6 Additionally, despite acknowledging public rights
in coastal lands, Hale recognized no limitations on the sovereign's power
of conveyance." However, Hale did not view this as a compromise of
the public's rights; rather, Hale recognized the existence of public rights
of use in navigable waters despite conveyances to private individuals."8
Therefore, a public trust doctrine did exist in the English common law
because public rights were protected whether the land in question was
owned by the King or by a private individual.5 9
B. Emergence of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine
1. American common law: development of the doctrine
a. the emerging doctrine: public trust rights guaranteed in the original
thirteen states
The concept of a public trust doctrine emerged in American com-
mon law after the revolution.' The first case to discuss the public trust
doctrine was Arnold v. Mundy,61 a New Jersey Court of Errors and Ap-
peals decision holding that navigable rivers in which the tide ebbed and
flowed, and the beds beneath the rivers, were held by New Jersey in trust
for the use and benefit of its people. 2 In this case, the plaintiff, Arnold,
planted an oyster bed below the low-water mark in the Raritan River at
the mouth of Raritan Bay.63 Arnold claimed title to the bed of the river
as incident to his title to land on the bank of the river." The court held
that Arnold did not and could not have title to the riverbed because the
56. S. MOORE, supra note 52, at 384. The King did, in some instances, grant land under
the sea, where a private landowner could exclusively possess a creek or bay. Id. at 672.
57. Comment, supra note 16, at 48.
58. Id. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a description of navigable waters in
the English common law.
59. Comment, supra note 16, at 48.
60. Jampol, supra note 1, at 23. Early American common-law development necessarily
relied upon English law, because American lawyers were most familiar with English law, and
sources were more readily available than for other legal systems such as French law. G. GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 19-20 (1977).
61. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); see Comment, supra note 16, at 55.
62. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77. Prior to the revolution, the coastal lands in New Jersey
were held by the Duke of York in his sovereign capacity as governor in trust for the people.
Id. at 77. After the revolution, New Jersey gained possession of these lands with the same
rights and duties as the Duke of York had held, thus preserving the public rights. Id. at 78.
63. Id. at 65.
64. Id. at 65-66. Arnold claimed that although the deed to the land described the land as
extending to the bank of the river, the previous owner had maintained an oyster bed in the
same area, and there was no interference with navigation. Id.
1326 [Vol. 22:1319
June 1989] EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
State of New Jersey held title to navigable rivers, such as the Raritan,
that were influenced by the tide.65 The court reasoned that the state held
title to protect public rights of fishing and navigation in these waters;
thus, the state could not abrogate the public's rights by a conveyance to a
private landowner.66
The Arnold court relied on Lord Hale's principles of sovereign do-
minion of the King in the seas, their arms, and navigable rivers affected
by the ebb and flow of the tide.6 7 Using these principles, the court deter-
mined that the public trust doctrine that existed in English law applied in
New Jersey.68 Accordingly, the state held title to the navigable waters
influenced by the tide to protect the rights of the public.6 9
The Supreme Court of the United States affimed the Arnold princi-
ples in Martin v. Waddell.7' Martin similarly involved a claim to oyster
beds underneath the navigable waters of the Raritan River near Raritan
Bay, waters that were affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.71 The
Supreme Court interpreted Hale's writings as confirming the English
common-law rule that the King held, in trust for the public, lands under
navigable waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.72 The Court
held that the rights and responsibilities held by the English sovereign
prior to the revolution-holding title in trust for public use to lands
under navigable waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide-translated
65. Id. at 76-78.
66. Id. The court discussed protection of the public's rights as follows:
[Tfhe navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts
of the sea, including both the water and the land under the water, for the purpose of
passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses
of the water and its products... are common to all the citizens, and... the property
... is vested in the sovereign .... The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot,
consistently with the principles of the law ... make a direct and absolute grant of the
waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right.
Id.
The Arnold court also set down two important principles of riverfront ownership: (1) a
conveyance along a river that was not navigable and was not influenced by the tide extended to
mid-channel, and (2) a conveyance along a navigable, tidal river extended only to the high-tide
line. Id. at 67.
67. Id. at 74 (citing M. HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM,
reprinted in S. MooRE, A HmsTORY OF THE FORESHORE 370 (3d ed. 1888)). The court sup-
ported its reliance on Hale's writings by describing them as "the great foundations upon which
[principles of the public trust doctrine] are to rest." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 76-77. The reliance on Hale resulted from a misinterpretation of his writings;
Hale never placed full title to navigable waters in the government, and recognized that there
were few restraints on the sovereign's power to convey coastal lands. See supra notes 53-59
and accompanying text.
70. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id. at 412-13.
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into the rights and responsibilities of each of the thirteen original states
subsequent to the revolution.73 Hence, title to the Raritan River bed was
deemed to be held by the State of New Jersey, in trust for its people.
74
b. the role of the Supreme Court: the significance
offederal and state law
Public trust cases involve issues of both federal and state law. As a
matter of federal law, Congress admits new states into the Union.7s
When a state is admitted, federal law determines the lands to which title
passes from the United States to the state.76 Therefore, since a state upon
gaining statehood receives title from the United States to navigable wa-
ters and their underlying lands, federal law defines navigability in deter-
mining title for this purpose.77 Thus, in this context, a federal test of
navigability applies to issues of determining original state title in naviga-
ble waters and their underlying lands, and Supreme Court decisions are
binding as to the tests determining state title.78
73. Id. The Court stated that since the states obtained the same rights with the limitations
of the public trust as held by the English sovereign, there was no justification to allow the state
to grant the lands within the trust to private individuals. Id. at 413. The Court observed:
[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sover-
eign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.
Id. at 410.
74. Id.
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
76. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, 27-28 (1934). As the Oregon Court specifi-
cally stated, "[tihe laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands."
Id. at 27. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669,
670 (1891).
77. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14. The Court stated that "[s]ince the effect upon the title to such
lands [navigable waters and their underlying lands] is the result of federal action in admitting a
state to the Union, the question, whether the waters within the State under which the lands lie
are navigable or non-navigable, is a federal, not a [state] one." Id.
Although the federal government passes title to the state in navigable waters, the federal
government retains a navigational easement to regulate and maintain the waterways for pur-
poses of interstate commerce. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Lazarus, supra note 2, at
636-37. However, the federal test of navigability to determine state title is not necessarily the
same as the federal test of navigability to determine existence of a federal navigational ease-
ment. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 637. As a matter of federal law, federal courts can develop a
distinct test for the purpose of determining state title. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14 (citing United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 56
(1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922)).
78. The original federal test of navigability applied to navigable waters where the tide
ebbed and flowed. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 417-18. Twentieth century cases defined the
federal test of navigability as inclusive of waters "used, or... susceptible of being used, in its
natural and ordinary condition, as a highway for commerce." Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S.
574, 586 (1921); see also Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14. Most recently, the Court has held that the
1328
June 1989] EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the public
trust doctrine, the doctrine exists solely as a matter of state common
law.7" Each state has the authority to determine which of its lands are
within the public trust, and which of its lands are not within the trust
and therefore may be conveyed to private parties free of the trust.
8 0
Thus, applicability and scope of the public trust doctrine are matters of
state discretion. 1
c. the equal footing doctrine: public trust doctrine applied in new
states as they are admitted to the Union
Under the rights and responsibilities theory of the Martin Court, the
original basis for the public trust doctrine was applicable only to the orig-
inal thirteen states.82 In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,3 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that pursuant to the "equal footing" doctrine, 4
new states entering the Union received title to lands under navigable
water to the same extent as the original states.85 Without articulating a
specific test as to what types of waterways constituted navigable waters,
the Pollard Court determined that all new states received title to their
federal test of navigability for fresh waters depends upon the existence or potential of use in
commerce and navigation, while the federal test of navigability for tidal waters simply depends
upon the existence of the tide. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 797
(1988).
79. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26; see Lazarus, supra note 2, at 637.
80. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
81. Id. However, the Court in some instances may dictate limits on a state's wholesale
ability to convey its lands to private owners. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
455-56 (1892); see also infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
82. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410; see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
The original thirteen states were the only states that took possession of their lands directly
from the English sovereign, because they were the only states existing at the time of the revolu-
tion in 1776. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
83. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
84. The equal footing doctrine has been described as the entitlement of new states "to the
lands beneath their navigable waters subject to the same trust" as held by the original states.
Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmen-
talRight, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 195, 200 (1980). Not only did the new states receive title to
the lands within the trust, but the United States government was obligated to not convey these
lands to any other party both before and after new states attained statehood. Id.; Comment,
Ownership Rights to Submerged and Formerly Submerged Land in New Jersey, 91 DICK. L.
Rnv. 833, 839 (1987); see also Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65
(1873).
85. Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 228-29. Thus, when Alabama became a state it
received title to the lands underneath navigable waters; this title could not be defeated by a
later grant from the United States government to a private individual because the United
States government had no power to make such a conveyance. Id. at 220, 228-29.
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navigable waters.8 6 Additionally, the Court held that the states also re-
ceived title to the soils under navigable waters.87 Thus, under the equal
footing doctrine, new states "succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and eminent domain which [the original states] possessed at
the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the
public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the
United States."88 In this manner, the new states gained sovereign title to
navigable waters and the soils under the navigable waters within their
territory, and thereafter were free to apply the public trust according to
their own policies.
2. American common law: the scope of the public trust doctrine
Initial decisions of the American courts established that under the
public trust doctrine, states held title to those navigable waters affected
by the ebb and flow of the tide, and could include these waters and their
underlying lands within the public trust.89 Subsequent judicial decisions
focused more precisely on the scope of the doctrine and definition of pub-
lic trust lands,9" as well as the powers of the state governments to control
and convey these lands.91
a. scope of the public trust doctrine: expansion to include inland, non-
tidal navigable waters
The public trust doctrine, as developed from the English common
law, historically encompassed only those waters that were affected by the
tide because most rivers in England and along the coast of the original
86. Id. at 229. The Court also referred to the importance of state ownership and control
over these lands to preserve state sovereignty and protect the exercise of state police powers.
Id. at 230.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 223. These principles have been reaffirmed recently. See, e.g., Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), where the Court stated:
[O]wnership of land under navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty; [these lands
are held] in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they enter the
Union and assume sovereignty on an "equal footing" with the established States.
Id. at 551 (footnotes omitted).
89. See, eg., Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77; see also supra
notes 61-74 and accompanying text. This doctrine similarly applied to all incoming states
under the equal footing doctrine. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
90. See, eg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); see also infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
91. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also infra notes 112-20
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:1319
June 1989] EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
thirteen states were tidal.92 However, the topography in the United
States differed greatly from England. In the United States, there were
many inland, fresh-water lakes and rivers that were large enough to be
used as commercial highways, but were not as of that time included
within the scope of the public trust doctrine.9 3 States could not rely on a
"tidal test" of navigability to assert title to and control over fresh-water
lakes and rivers as they had over rivers affected by the tide.94 Thus, it
became imperative that governments find a means to exercise control
over inland fresh waters. 95
The first decision involving government dominion over non-tidal
waters was The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,9 6 a case determining
whether federal admiralty jurisdiction existed as to a ship collision on
Lake Ontario in New York, an inland fresh-water lake.97 One party ob-
jected to federal jurisdiction over the matter, asserting that the Court did
not have jurisdiction since the lake was not tidal water.98 The Court held
that admiralty jurisdiction did not depend upon whether the waterway in
question was tidal; it had jurisdiction over public waters-those waters
that were in fact navigable.99 The Court determined that the traditional
definition of navigable waters-those waters influenced by the tide-re-
ally referred only to waters that were in fact navigable.l" ° Thus, "tide
water and navigable water [were] synonymous terms," and "public" riv-
ers were those capable of being navigated, as distinguished from non-
navigable "private" rivers. 10'
Subsequent decisions of the Court, relying on the principles stated in
92. Comment, supra note 16, at 54-55. In England, only those rivers affected by the tide
were navigable. Jampol, supra note 1, at 7; see also supra note 41.
93. Jampol, supra note 1, at 7. Thus, important waterways such as the Mississippi River
and the Great Lakes were initially excluded from the public trust doctrine. Id. Up to this
point, the public trust doctrine had only included those waters that were navigable and subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
94. Jampol, supra note 1, at 7.
95. Id. A tidal test of navigability "simply made no sense" to the states with fresh-water
lakes and rivers, especially with the invention of the steam engine, which made these water-
ways more accessible. Stevens, supra note 84, at 201.
96. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
97. Id. at 450-52.
98. Id. at 454.
99. Id. at 457. Although the Court did not specifically define navigable-in-fact, the Court
cited section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which described jurisdiction applicable to waters
that were navigable "by vessels of ten or more tons burden." Id. (quoting Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77). Thus, it appears that the Court was referring to waters upon
which a ship could actually navigate.
100. Id. at 455.
101. Id. The Court acknowledged that the definition of "navigable" as "tidal" made sense
in England, but described application of that definition in the United States as "merely arbi-
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Genesee Chief, determined that states received title to navigable waters
not affected by the tide, and thus the states were free to apply the public
trust doctrine to these areas."02 For example, in Barney v. Keokuk, 10 3 the
Court held that the state received title to the navigable waters of the
Mississippi River above the flow of the tide, and thus the state could
include these areas within its public trust." 4 The Court held as a general
rule that "all waters are deemed navigable which are really so." 'o This
new principle which recognized the existence of state title and placed the
navigable waters and the soil beneath them within the public trust was
equally applicable to fresh waters as to tidewaters.10 6 The reason behind
the rule that the state had title to and the public trust included all navi-
gable waters-whether or not affected by the tide-was that there should
be public control of the "great passageways of commerce and navigation,
to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience." ' 7 Thus, the
settled rule became that states had title to all waters navigable in fact,
whether or not affected by the tide, and thus these areas could be in-
cluded in the public trust.10
Later decisions also expanded the purposes of the public trust doc-
trary, without any foundation in reason." Id. at 454. The Court thus rejected the rule that
tidal influence was the test of "public waters." Id. at 457.
The "tidal" definition of navigability did not appear to be supported by English decisions
either. See, e.g., Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 98 Eng. Rep. 980 (1774), wherein the court ques-
tioned tidality as the proper test of public land:
How does it appear that this is a navigable river? The flowing and reflowing of the
tide does not make it so; for there are many places into which the tide flows that are
not navigable rivers; and the place in question may be a creek in their own private
estate.
Id. at 981.
102. See, eg., Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877). Note that although the Supreme Court of the United
States has discussed the scope of the public trust doctrine as applied to the states, questions of
the scope of the doctrine and specific tests of navigability for application of the doctrine are
matters of state law. Stevens, supra note 84, at 202; see also supra notes 79-81 and accompany-
ing text.
103. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
104. Id. at 337-38.
105. Id. at 336.
106. Id. at 338. The Court conceded that if states had relied on the ebb and flow of the tide
as the rule of navigability, it was for the states themselves to determine whether to change the
rule. Id. However, the Court also commented that doctrines that placed only waters affected
by the tides within the public trust were contrary "to sound principles of public policy," due to
the confusion between "tide water" and "navigable" water. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. This principle was affirmed in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). There, the
Court conceded that while each state was free to develop its public trust doctrine as to its
navigable waters, the prevailing rule as to state title was that the states held title to their
navigable rivers; a rule dependent upon tidal influence "would be highly unreasonable when
1332
June 1989] EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 1333
trine beyond the historical common-law purposes of navigation, fishing
and commerce.' 0 9 According to their individual needs, states have held
that the public trust doctrine encompasses navigable waters for other
purposes, such as preserving beaches and waters for bathing, recreation
and production of minerals." 0 Public trust purposes have expanded as
states have sought to maximize finite resources."'
b. limitations on a state government's ability to dispose
of public trust lands
Federal legislative control over navigable waterways is generally
limited to a federal navigation easement protecting the navigability of
waterways in furtherance of interstate commerce." 2 Otherwise, each
state retains authority to dispose of its lands as it desires, according to
the constraints of its public trust." 3 However, state authority is not ab-
solute. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, " 4 the Supreme Court
of the United States delineated some limits on the states' ability to dis-
pose of public trust lands."' In Illinois Central, the Illinois legislature
had granted the entire Chicago Harbor area along and under Lake Mich-
igan to a private corporation." 6 The Court held that a grant of such
applied [to rivers within the states]." Id. at 31-32 (quoting Carson v. Blazer, 2 Bin. 475, 477,
478 (Pa. 1810)).
Additionally, in Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891), the Court stated that "[tjhose rivers
are regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact." Id. at 667. Thus
"the test of navigability of waters ... [the ebb and flow of the tide] has had no place in
American jurisprudence since the decision in the case of [Genesee ChieA, and is therefore no
test of riparian ownership." McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 78 (1909) (citing The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852)).
109. Public trust lands were "chiefly valuable for the public purposes of commerce, naviga-
tion and fishery." Shively, 152 U.S. at 49.
110. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971)
(public trust doctrine includes bathing rights); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797
(1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929) (oil drilling within public trust purpose); Van Ness v.
Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978) (beach areas within public trust doctrine);
Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 20 Pa. Commw. 186,
341 A.2d 556 (1975) (production of sand and gravel from water beds); see also Jampol, supra
note 1, at 11; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 649.
111. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 651.
112. Id. at 636-37; Stevens, supra note 84, at 202-03.
113. Jampol, supra note 1, at 10. The most common state utilization of public trust lands
has been granting those lands for development, subject to state restrictions. Id.
114. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Illinois Central has been labelled "the most celebrated public
trust case in American law." Jampol, supra note 1, at 34. Prior to Illinois Central, there was
little limitation on the power of a state to convey tidelands into ownership free of the public
trust. Id. at 33.
115. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
116. Id. at 433.
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magnitude by a state legislature impaired the sovereignty of the state,
and was therefore void.1" 7 The state could convey public trust land, but
the power to convey was restricted." 8 The Court held that the state
could only make conveyances where: (1) the conveyance was consistent
with the purposes of the public trust; or (2) the public's interests were not
substantially impaired by the conveyance. 1 9 Thus, the Court agreed
that some grants to private individuals could be upheld.'20
III. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. V MISSISSIPPI
American courts have consistently held that the states have title to
and the public trust could include lands under both navigable tidal and
navigable fresh-water waterways. 2' In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Missis-
sippi,'22 however, the Supreme Court of the United States held that state
title had never been limited to just navigable waters.' 23 The Phillips
Court held that the states had title to all tidal areas-all land under
water affected by the tide, regardless of whether the waters were naviga-
ble-which thus could be included within the public trust.'24
4. The Facts
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi'25 involved a title dispute over
forty-two acres of submerged land under the Bayou LaCroix and eleven
117. Id. at 453. The Court specifically stated that "[t]he State... [cannot] abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties." Id. The Court
analogized such a grant to an abdication by the state of its police powers. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Thus, the Court stated:
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them
may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers
therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and,
so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made
to the grants .... [G]rants of parcels of lands under navigable waters.., in aid of
commerce... [that] do not substantially impair the public interest... [are] sustained
in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the
trust to the public.
Id. at 452.
120. Id. at 453; see also Jampol, supra note 1, at 34-35; Comment, supra note 16, at 59-60.
121. See, eg., McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876);
Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); State ex rel. Rice v.
Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 184 So. 44 (1938); O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 235
A.2d 1 (1967).
122. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
123. Id. at 795.
124. Id.; see infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
125. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
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small drainage streams.'26 The separate submerged tracts of land ranged
from one-half acre to ten acres,127 but six of the drainage streams had less
than one acre in total surface area. 128 The acres in dispute were under-
neath water influenced by the tide because the streams were connected to
the Jourdan River, a navigable tidal river that flowed into the Gulf of
Mexico. 129 However, the bayou and drainage streams were not a part of
the Jourdan River, were not navigable, and were located several miles
from the Gulf of Mexico. 3 '
Phillips Petroleum Company and Cinque Bambini Partnership
1 3 1
claimed to hold record title to these acres, originally derived from a
Spanish land grant prior to Mississippi's statehood.132 The State of Mis-
sissippi claimed that these acres were within its public trust lands because
when Mississippi became a state in 1817, it gained title to all water-
ways-and the lands beneath them-subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide. 133 Mississippi had not exercised any authority over the lands in
question prior to 1970, when the state conducted surveys to determine
which lands were within the public trust and therefore subject to a new
state coastal wetlands protection law.134 Once the surveys were com-
plete, however, the State Mineral Lease Commission decided to use the
surveys to issue oil and gas leases on state-owned land.135 Eventually,
the Commission issued oil and gas leases on 600 acres of land owned by
Phillips.
136
126. Id. at 793. The dispute concerned 140 acres under the Bayou and nearby waters; the
Mississippi Supreme Court had held that all but 42 acres were privately held and not subject to
the public trust. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 510 (Miss. 1986), aff'd
sub nom Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); see also infra note 137.
127. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793.
128. Cinque Bambini, J91 So. 2d at 510.
129. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793.
130. Id.
131. The name "Phillips" hereinafter will refer to both Phillips Petroleum Company and
Cinque Bambini Partnership.
132. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793. Phillips claimed that it had valid record title pursuant to an
1813 Spanish land grant, which had subsequently been confirmed in 1819 by an Act of Con-
gress, and by federal and state patents. Mississippi became a state in 1817. Cinque Bambini,
491 So. 2d at 510-11.
133. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793. Mississippi claimed that by the equal footing doctrine, all
lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were within the public trust, irrespec-
tive of whether the waterways were navigable. Id. For a discussion of the equal footing doc-
trine relative to the public trust, see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
The Mississippi Supreme Court stated that even if the original Spanish land grant had
been valid, Phillips could not have title if title to the lands had been conveyed to Mississippi
upon gaining statehood. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 511.
134. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Phillips filed suit to quiet title to the 600 acres, as well as an addi-
tional 1800 acres. 137 The Chancery court held that all waters influenced
by the tide-and the land beneath them below the high-tide line-were
state-owned land, and thus within the public trust, but found that only
approximately 140 acres were actually state-owned and within the scope
of the public trust in this case.1 38 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme
Court reduced the lands within the scope of the public trust to forty-two
acres.139 The court determined that upon gaining statehood, Mississippi
received title to all tidelands and navigable waters-" ° Therefore, the
court held that the state held title to Phillips' forty-two acres of tide-
lands, and could include these lands within its public trust. 141
Phillips objected to the court's ruling, asserting that the forty-two
acres were not state land and not within the public trust because none of
the overlying waterways were navigable. 42 Therefore, Phillips peti-
tioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to
reverse the Mississippi Supreme Court.143 Phillips sought recognition
that state title in tidal areas was limited, and to limit the scope of the
public trust doctrine to those waters that were navigable, which would
have excluded the acres in dispute."4
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Mississippi
Supreme Court's decision that the state held title to these acres, holding
that all lands beneath tidal waters were state land and therefore within
the public trust, regardless of whether the waters were in fact naviga-
ble.'45 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, dis-
137. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Phillips held title to more than 2400 acres, including
the acres disputed in the main case. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510. Mississippi claimed
that since these lands were tidelands, it had title and the tidelands were subject to the public
trust. Id. The Chancery Court held that only 140 of these acres were subject to the public
trust. Id. Since 98 acres of these submerged tidelands were created by the artificial means of
dredging, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that Mississippi had title to only 42 acres,
which thus were within the public trust. Id. at 510-11. The court held that "fee simple title to
all lands naturally subject to tidal influence, inland to today's mean high water mark, is held by
the State of Mississippi in trust." Id.
138. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510-11. Of the 140 acres, 98 were artificial lakes cre-
ated by dredging. Id. at 510; see also supra note 137.
140. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510-12. The court stated that the tidelands were "all
lands naturally subject to tidal influence, inland to today's mean high water mark." Id. at 510-
11.
141. Id.
142. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 799.
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sented, stating that the appropriate test as to whether waters are owned
by the state should be navigability of the waters, regardless of whether
the waters in question were tidal or non-tidal.146
B. Reasoning of the Court
1. The majority opinion
In an opinion written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, the majority
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,47 held that states have title to all
their submerged tidal lands. 148 According to the Phillips Court, the
rights of the states to tidal lands under the public trust doctrine have
been affirmed many times. 49
The Court placed much emphasis on its decision in Shively v.
Bowlby.' 50 Shively concerned ownership of lands below the high-tide line
near the mouth of the Columbia River in Oregon.' 51 The Shively Court
held that the land in question, which was between the high- and low-tide
lines and alternately covered and uncovered by the tide, was held by the
State of Oregon, and therefore within the public trust.'52 The Phillips
Court relied on Shively as clear precedent that the Court had consistently
held all land influenced by tidal water to be state land and within the
public trust.' 3 Thus, the Phillips Court dismissed Phillips' contention
that "the original States did not claim title to non-navigable tidal wa-
ters."'5 4 The Court also supported its position by citing cases in which
146. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
148. Id. at 795.
149. Id. at 794 & n.2.
150. 152 U.S. 1 (1894). Shively was described by the Phillips Court as "the seminal case in
American public trust jurisprudence." Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 793-94 (quoting Petitioner's Re-
ply Brief at 11, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870)).
151. Shively, 152 U.S. at 9.
152. Id. at 57-58. The Shively Court concluded:
At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the
King for the benefit of the nation.... Upon the American Revolution, these rights,
charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their respective
borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution of the United
States.... The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Consti-
tution have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands
under them, within their respective jurisdictions.
Id. at 57.
153. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
154. Id. Phillips claimed that the original states only claimed title to navigable tidal waters.
The Court stated that since the cases upon which Phillips relied were from states that had
abandoned the common-law rule holding tidelands within the public trust, these cases were not
controlling. Id. at 794-95 & n.4.
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lands held to be within the public trust were not. held for navigational
purposes. 5 ' Accordingly, the Court reatfirmed its rule that the states
have title to lands underneath water subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide, which the states can then include within their public trusts.1 6 Since
the lands in question in this case were under water subject to the tides,
Mississippi held title and could apply the public trust."7
The Court also addressed Phillips' arguments that the tidal influ-
ence rule was geographically tailored to England, where all navigable
rivers are subject to tidal influence. 5 ' Although Phillips produced some
authority to show that no non-navigable waters were held in the public
trust in England, 15 9 the Court determined that the cases cited by Phillips
were not concerned with non-navigable tidal waters."x6 Additionally, the
Court was not concerned with the state of the English common law, and
stated that the only relevant precedent was the Court's previous interpre-
tations of the common law.'
61
The Court recognized that the navigability rule was applicable in
determining whether fresh-water lakes and rivers and their underlying
lands were state land. 62 However, the Court decided that the navigabil-
155. Id. at 795; see, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891) (reclamation of lands for
urban expansion); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877) (planting and harvesting of oys-
ters); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (public trust lands used for fishing);
Den v. Jersey Co., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 426 (1854) (reclamation of lands for urban expansion).
156. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 795.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 796; see Jampol, supra note 1, at 7. But see supra note 41.
159. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
160. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 796; see, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 2318 (1987) (state held title to navigable fresh-water lake); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 (1934) (state did not have title to bed of non-navigable fresh-water lake); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1921) (state did not have title to non-navigable fresh-water river); The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852) (federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion existed concerning navigable fresh-water waterways).
161. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 796. The Court stated:
[W]e will not now enter the debate on what the English law was with respect to the
land under such waters, for it is perfectly clear how this Court understood the com-
mon law of royal ownership, and what the Court considered the rights of the original
and later-entering States .... [The] Court has consistently interpreted the common
law as providing that the lands beneath waters under tidal influence were given States
upon their admission into the Union.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court also stated that although none of the cases supporting their decision dealt with
non-navigable tidal waters, they were satisfied that these cases provided an accurate descrip-
tion of the law as applied to non-navigable tidal waters. Id.
162. Id. In Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 457, the Court held that admiralty jurisdic-
tion "depend[ed] upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of
the tide," reasoning that American topography was characterized by extensive waterways not
subject to tidal influence.
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ity rule was meant to apply only to inland fresh waters, and was a differ-
ent test than the ebb and flow rule that applied to tidal waters.
163
Accordingly, the adoption of a navigability rule as to inland fresh waters
did not supplant the ebb and flow rule as to tidal waters.
16
In support of its use of the ebb and flow rule, the Court observed
that the non-navigable waters at issue were connected to the sea by a
navigable tidal river and as such, were part of the sea. 165 The Court also
stated two policy reasons in support of the ebb and flow rule: (1) its
uniformity, certainty and ease of application; and (2) non-disruption of
property owners' expectations, resulting from the rule's long history of
use. 166 In support of the policy to uphold a property owner's expecta-
tions, the Court stated that there could not be any reasonable expecta-
tions to the contrary since Mississippi law had consistently claimed title
and held tidelands to be within the public trust.' 67 The Court accord-
ingly upheld the ebb and flow rule to avoid upsetting settled property
laws in the various states. 168
2. The dissenting opinion
The dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Ste-
vens and Scalia, recognized that the ebb and flow rule applied to tidewa-
ters, but disagreed with the majority's contention that the cases cited
163. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 797.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 798-99. The Court stated that because these waters were subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, this land was owned by the state pursuant to the ebb and flow rule. Id. The
Court went on to state:
[T]here is a difference in degree between the waters in this case, and non-navigable
waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide. But there is no difference in
kind. For in the end, all tide waters are connected to the sea.... [All these waters]
share those "geographical, chemical and environmental" qualities that make lands
beneath tidal waters unique.
Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
166. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798.
167. Id. Navigability could not be the applicable rule, since many of Mississippi's cases
"described uses of [public trust lands] not related to navigability, such as bathing, swimming,
recreation, fishing, and mineral development." Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798; see Treuting v.
Bridge and Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967). But see infra notes 255-71 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Mississippi's common law.
168. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 799. The Court did not believe that there were any equitable
considerations that might entitle Phillips to a different decision. Id. This determination was
further supported by Mississippi law which held that the state could not lose ownership of
lands by any equitable doctrines. Id.; see, ag., Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.
2d 508, 521 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791
(1988); Gibson v. State Land Comm'r, 374 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1979); City of Bay St. Louis v.
Board of Supervisors, 80 Miss. 364, 32 So. 54 (1902).
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supported a general assertion of title and public trust dominion over all
non-navigable tidal waters. 169 The dissent stated that the Court had
never recognized state title to discrete, non-navigable waterways separate
from any navigable body of water.17 Justice O'Connor asserted that
state title existed only to land underlying navigable waters, whether or
not subject to tidal influence.' 71 Justice O'Connor also asserted that no
reason existed for applying different tests to fresh-water and tidal
waterways. 
1 72
The dissent based its opinion on the English common-law public
trust doctrine. 73 Under that law, navigable waterways were held for
public use and the King had dominion over "the sea and the arms of the
sea, 'where the sea flows and reflows,' " as well as the soils beneath those
waters.174 The dissent relied on Martin v. Waddell175 for the proposition
that the original states held lands within the public trust as successors to
the English King.176 States entering the union acquired under the equal
footing doctrine title to lands and the same rights regarding the public
trust as those held by the original states. 177 However, Justice O'Connor
noted that the English common-law rule had not been applied to non-
navigable tidal waters; rather, the English cases applied the public trust
only to land underneath navigable water.
178
Additionally, the dissent considered purposes of a state's assertion
of title and public trust dominion, stating that the "fundamental purpose
169. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Navigable waters included lands
"beneath waters that were part of or immediately bordering a navigable body of water." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894).
170. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that
"none of [the Court's] decisions recognized a State's public trust title to land underlying a
discrete and wholly non-navigable body of water that is properly viewed as separate from any
navigable body of water." Id. (O'Connor, 3., dissenting).
171. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM
EJUSDEM, cap. iv (1667), reprinted in R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND
THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM, apps. vii, ix (2d ed.
1875)).
175. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
176. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 70-74 and
accompanying text.
177. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845)). For a discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see supra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
178. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Rex v. Smith, 99 Eng. Rep.
283 (1780); Le Roy v. Trinity House, 82 Eng. Rep. 986 (1662)).
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of the public trust is to protect commerce." 179 Therefore, since the main
public interest was commerce, jurisdiction of the public trust should be
equivalent to admiralty jurisdiction. 8 ' The dissent thus relied on The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,' where the Supreme Court held
that admiralty jurisdiction covered all navigable waterways, and recog-
nized that admiralty jurisdiction did not depend on whether the ebb and
flow of the tide affected the waterway.'1 2 The dissent then concluded
that because admiralty jurisdiction applied only to navigable waterways,
the same test applied to the public trust in determining to which water-
ways states held title, and thus could be included in the trust.
183
The dissent also discussed other reasons why the ebb and flow rule
should not determine the extent of state title. The dissent objected to the
majority's "test that will include in the public trust every body of water
that is interconnected to the ocean, even indirectly, no matter how re-
mote it is from navigable water."'8 4 Instead, the dissent preferred a navi-
gability test as the sole test to determine to which waterways and lands
beneath them the state held title.8 5 The dissent contended that testing
by navigability would apply uniformly to any waterway, whether or not
influenced by the tide, thereby eliminating the need to distinguish be-
tween salt and fresh water.8 6 Thus, the dissent would have held that
title to the forty-two acres remained in Phillips since the waterway,
179. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that according to precedent, nav-
igable waterways were within the public trust to preserve the waterways for transportation.
Id. (O'Connor, L, dissenting) (citing Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891)). The dissent
conceded that "[s]tates may commit public trust waterways to uses other than transportation,
such as fishing or land reclamation." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
182. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1852)). Subsequent cases also held that ebb
and flow of the tide was not a proper test for the navigability of waters. See, eg., The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
183. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent believed its proposi-
tions valid, even though the cases cited concerned inland, fresh-water waterways. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70,78 (1909); Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877)). Thus, the dissent determined that the same reasoning logically ap-
plied to both tidewaters and inland fresh-water waterways. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The dissent also cited the Submerged Lands Act to indicate Congress' intent that lands be-
neath navigable waters were within the public trust, exclusive of tidal lands beneath non-navi-
gable waters. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1953)).
184. Id. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the majority's hold-
ing was "wholly inconsistent with the federal law" that determined to which inland fresh
waters the states received title that thus could be included in the public trust. Id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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although tidal, was non-navigable."l 7 Moreover, the dissent indicated
that upon gaining statehood, states only acquired title to those waterways
and lands beneath them that were navigable, irrespective of tidal
influence.""
IV. ANALYSIS
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,18 9 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that each state upon gaining statehood acquired sover-
eign title and control over all its lands that were covered by water influ-
enced by the tide. 9' In support of its holding, the Court stated that
recognizing state title to all "tidelands," whether or not navigable, was
consistent with its prior holdings. 91 The Court also supported its deci-
sion on the basis that to hold otherwise would upset the reasonable ex-
pectations of property owners based upon the common-law confines of
the public trust of the State of Mississippi.1 92
The following analysis demonstrates that the Court's reliance upon
precedent was misplaced since none of these cases addressed discrete,
non-navigable tidal areas.1 93 In its reliance on these cases, the Court de-
stroyed any distinction between the non-navigable edge of a navigable
river and discrete, non-navigable waterways.1 94 The Court also miscon-
strued the ebb and flow rule as a separate test of navigability,19 when in
fact the rule was just a different way of stating the navigability rule as
applied to tidal waters. Although the Court correctly determined that
187. Id. at 803-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent worried that the majority's deci-
sion would displace many record title holders and upset current expectations as to property
rights. Id. at.804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see infra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
The dissent doubted that state courts would recognize any equitable doctrines that could de-
feat the public trust, pointing to Mississippi courts' refusals to consider estoppel against the
state. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 804-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 803-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
190. Id. at 795.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 798-99.
193. See, eg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Treuting v.
Bridge and Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967); Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss.
704, 146 So. 192 (1933).
194. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 797. The Court stated that there was no need to make such a
distinction, because "in the end, all tide waters are connected to the sea... [despite the
possibility that] the lands at issue here differ in some ways from tidelands directly adjacent to
the sea." Id.
195. Id. The Phillips Court described the ebb and flow rule as the test determining title in
tidal areas, distinct from the navigability rule applying only to fresh waters. Id.
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state law can limit or expand the confines of land held in the public
trust,196 the Court failed to fully explore and follow such state decisions.
The Court also incorrectly concluded that its holding would not upset
the reasonable expectations of property owners, 197 when in fact its hold-
ing raised the potential for that result.
A. Phillips' Extension of the Public Trust Doctrine to Discrete,
Non-navigable Tidelands
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,198 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that state title existed to areas that it had never before held to be
state land.' 99 As recognized by both the majority opinion2"° and the dis-
senting opinion, the Court had never decided the issue presented in Phil-
lips: "[W]hether a State holds [title to] all land underlying tidally
influenced waters that are neither navigable themselves nor part of any
navigable body of water."2 By misconstruing the holdings of precedent
and relying on dicta, the Court concluded that discrete, non-navigable
inland tidelands were state land, and thus within the scope of the public
trust.202
1. The ebb and flow rule: a synonym, not a
separate test of navigability
One of the arguments propounded by Phillips was that "ebb and
flow" and "navigability" were synonymous in the American common
law.20 3 This contention was supported by the initial public trust cases,
which stated that the waters that were state-owned and within the public
196. Id. at 798-99; see infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
197. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798-99.
198. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
199. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 796. The majority stated that "[i]t is true that none of these cases actually dealt
with lands such as those involved in this case." Id. (citing Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1877)). However, the Court supported its reliance on these cases by stating:
[I]t has never been suggested in any of this Court's prior decisions that the many
statements included therein-to the effect that the States owned all the soil beneath
waters affected by the tide-were anything less than an accurate description of the
governing law.
Id.
201. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 795. The land involved in Phillips consisted of submerged land under 11 small
drainage streams inland from the Gulf of Mexico, connected to the Gulf by way of the Jourdan
River. Id. at 793; see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
203. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988)
(No. 86-870).
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trust were those that were navigable, irrespective of tidal influence.2" In
these early Supreme Court cases, the Court necessarily had to interpret
the English common law because English law was the only written law to
which the courts had access. 205 The early American cases involved dis-
putes as to lands under navigable tidal rivers.20 6 Thus, the reference in
the English cases to the ebb and flow of the tide was easily misconstrued
as a test of navigability since the only rivers that were important to the
English were those influenced by the tide.20 7
In fact, English cases and at least one commentator on English law
recognized that tidal influence was not the test of navigability, and that
some waters, such as small creeks, although affected by the tide were
privately owned.208 This supported the argument that the state only held
title to waterways upon which navigation was possible.20 9 Consistent
with the public trust, then, private individuals could own small creeks
that were non-navigable because physically they were too narrow or shal-
low for commercial use or navigation, despite being influenced by the
tide.21 0 These types of waterways would not be useful for commerce;
hence, states did not claim title, and the public trust doctrine historically
had not included them.211
204. In Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76 (1821), the court stated that waters within the
public trust were "the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows." In Martin v. Wad-
dell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 414 (1842), the Court explained that the original states gained
title to and public trust dominion over their navigable waters and their underlying lands be-
cause they were held in trust by the English sovereign. These two cases involved tidal naviga-
ble rivers. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
In later cases involving application of the public trust doctrine to non-tidal waters, discus-
sion of state title and of the public trust doctrine as applied to all waters in all states specifically
referred to navigability of the waters, not tidal influence. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324 (1877); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
205. See supra note 60.
206. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Tidal rivers were important to commerce
and navigation because the tide provided propulsion for ships. Id.
208. Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 98 Eng. Rep. 980 (1774) (tidal influence alone does not
make a river navigable); see supra note 101. Additionally, in Rex v. Montague, 107 Eng. Rep.
1183, 1184 (1825), the court stated that "it does not necessarily follow, because the tide flows
and reflows in any particular place, that it is therefore a public navigation, although of suffi-
cient size." See also Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Phillips (No. 86-870).
One English commentator discussed the rights of private ownership in tidally influenced
waters. Lord Hale recognized that "little streams and rivers," although affected by the tide,
could be privately owned. S. MOORE, supra note 52, at 374.
209. See Brief for Petitioners at 19-22, Phillips (No. 86-870).
210. S. MooRE, supra note 52, at 374.
211. See supra note 204.
More recently, New Jersey has claimed title and public trust dominion over marsh and
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The Phillips Court summarily discounted the above contentions,
stating that "[t]he cases relied on by [Phillips] ... did not deal with tidal,
non-navigable waters. ' 212 The Court also selectively chose to rely on
language in the English common law which seemed to indicate that all
tidal rivers were navigable.2 13 However, the case law upon which the
majority relied did not deal with the same type of tidal, non-navigable
waters at issue; the importance of this is explained in the following
section.
2. The distinction between non-navigable borders of navigable
tidewater and non-navigable tidewater
Although the Court recognized that the cases it cited did not specifi-
cally deal with the type of lands involved in Phillips, the Court de-em-
phasized the importance of the lack of specific precedent.214 Instead, the
Court focused on the principle in Shively v. Bowlby,215 that the states had
title to and broad dominion over the "lands beneath tidal waters.
216
The Court interpreted this to mean that states had title to any tidelands
within their borders.217
The Phillips Court did not recognize any distinction between the
non-navigable border of a navigable waterway, and a discrete non-navi-
gable waterway.218 The Court thus ignored the traditional definition of
what constitute tidelands. The early common law recognized: (1) a
grant of land bordering on a private waterway extended to mid-chan-
nel,21 9 and (2) a grant of land bordering on a public waterway extended
only to the mean high-tide line.220 The early public trust cases involved
waterways that were navigable; 22 although the rivers involved were
clearly within the definition of a public waterway according to navigabil-
ity, disputes still arose as to ownership of the soil at the edge of the wa-
meadow areas that are not navigable because of heavy vegetation yet are influenced by the tide.
See infra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
212. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 796.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
215. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
216. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 797.
219. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 67; see also supra note 66.
220. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 67. The Shively Court held that states have
authority to utilize their public trust lands as they see fit, and thus some states have granted
lands bordering public waterways down to the mean low-tide line. Shively, 152 U.S. at 54;
Jampol, supra note 1, at 25.
221. See Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 407; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 65-66; see also supra notes 61-
74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Arnold and Martin.
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terway, between the high- and low-tide lines.22 2 Disputes arose because
technically, these tidelands between the high- and low-tide lines were too
shallow to be navigable, yet were affected by the tide.22 3
Shively involved (this same type of dispute, where an individual
claimed title to lands below the high-water mark on the Columbia River
in Oregon, a navigable tidal river.224 The Shively Court held that a grant
of land bordering a navigable river did not pass title to the land below
high-water mark, where the tide ebbed and flowed.225 Thus, the "sweep-
ing statements of States' dominion over lands beneath tidal waters" relied
upon by the Phillips Court applied to lands between high- and low-tide
lines bordering navigable waters, not discrete areas of non-navigable wa-
ters affected by the tide.226
B. Rejection of the Ebb and Flow Test
Even if the ebb and flow test was recognized as a separate test of
navigability, Phillips contended that this test was abandoned when the
navigability-in-fact test was adopted.227 Clearly, the federal government
222. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
223. This common law definition of tidelands as land between high- and low-tide lines has
become the accepted general definition. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (5th ed. 1979);
see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
The Phillips Court recognized that Black's provides the "common meaning" for the term
tidelands, although the Court selectively quoted only part of this definition. Phillips, 108 S. Ct.
at 795 n.6.
224. Shively, 152 U.S. at 9.
225. Id. at 51.
226. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794. The Court similarly relied upon Knight v. United States
Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891), for the principle that "the settled rule of law ... [is] that
absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the
original States were reserved to the several States." Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (quoting Knight
v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891)). However, as in Shively, the dispute in
Knight involved lands in San Francisco bordering on Mission Creek, "a navigable arm of the
[San Francisco] bay." Knight, 142 U.S. at 183.
The Phillips Court recognized that a difference in degree existed between these tidelands
and the lands in dispute, but dismissed the possibility of any relevance in a distinction:
Admittedly, there is a difference in degree between the waters in this case, and non-
navigable waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide. But there is no differ-
ence in kind. For in the end, all tide waters are connected to the sea: the waters in
this case, for example, by a navigable, tidal river. Perhaps the lands at issue here
differ in some ways from tidelands directly adjacent to the sea; nonetheless, they still
share those "geographical, chemical and environmental" qualities that make lands
beneath tidal waters unique.
Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 797 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
The Court's sweeping definition encompasses every inch of tidal land, no matter where or
how located.
227. Brief for Petitioners at 32-34, Phillips (No. 86-870).
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abandoned the ebb and flow test as a definition of navigability in deter-
mining federal admiralty jurisdiction.22 Moreover, the navigability-in-
fact test was used by the Court in subsequent public trust cases to deter-
mine whether state title existed to the waterways and lands in ques-
tion.22 9 While no case has specifically rejected use of the ebb and flow
rule to determine state title, the focus of these cases has been on waters
that actually were navigable, and the lands that directly border these wa-
ters. Moreover, the Court has stated that "the term 'navigable waters,'
as there used [in Shively v. Bowiby], meant waters which were navigable
in fact."' 230
Despite these conclusions from prior public trust cases, the Court in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi231 did not interpret extension of
state title to fresh waters as having any impact on tests of state title to
tidal waters, which had consistently included all land under water influ-
enced by the tide.232 In the majority's opinion, navigability would be the
test only as to fresh waters.233 But as to tidewaters, the Court deter-
mined that navigability was not an issue: The sole test was whether the
land in question was underneath water affected by the tide.234 As
demonstrated above, this determination was the product of flawed histor-
ical analysis. The majority's test recognized state title beyond the reach
228. In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1852), the
Court determined that the navigable character of a waterway depended upon whether the
waterway was in fact navigable, and that a test of navigability dependent upon the ebb and
flow of the tide was "utterly inadmissible."
The principles from Genesee Chief were later confirmed as the appropriate standard to
test navigability in determining existence of admiralty jurisdiction in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557 (1870). As the Court stated:
[IThe ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any
test at all of the navigability of waters.... Those rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact ... when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.
Id. at 563.
229. See, eg., Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
These cases concerned disputes as to navigable fresh waters.
230. McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 78 (1909) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
The Court further stated that "[t]he definition was not inadvertent or unnecessary." Id. Thus,
no room was left for the ebb and flow test as a test of navigability when applied in tidal areas.
Id.
231. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
232. Id. at 797. The Court specifically stated that according to its precedents, the public
trust doctrine had always included "all lands beneath waters influenced by the ebb and flow of
the tide." Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Id.
234. Id. The majority considered the ebb and flow test to always have been in force and
effect, and thus had no hesitation in affirming it as the test determining state title to tidewaters.
Id. at 798.
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contemplated by its own precedents, and as a result, similarly extended
the reach of the public trust doctrine.235
In addition, by affirming the decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court,2 36 the majority also affirmed that court's farfetched definition of
navigability:
[S]o long as by unbroken water course-when the level of the
waters is at mean high water mark-one may hoist a sail upon
a toothpick and without interruption navigate from the naviga-
ble channel/area to land, always afloat, the waters traversed
and the lands beneath them are within the inland boundaries
[that] we consider the United States set for the properties
granted the State in trust.
2 37
This court's test of navigability serves no purpose linked to navigation
because a water course large enough to support a toothpick would not be
large enough to support boat traffic. Similarly, this type of water course
could serve no purpose for commerce, because it would not contain any
fish large enough to be caught, and other commercial activity could not
be supported without affecting the surrounding privately owned land.
C. Inconsistencies With State Common Law
According to the Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby,238 federal law
determines to which lands states received title upon gaining statehood.239
However, the Shively Court recognized that each state developed its own
public trust doctrine dealing with "the lands under the tide waters within
its borders," relative to reservation of state control and granting private
rights in public trust lands.2' This principle has been long established,
235. See, eg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
236. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
237. Id. at 515. Compare the definition of navigability in Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574
(1921). In Oklahoma, the Court held that because a river dividing Oklahoma and Texas was
not navigable, title to the bed of the river did not pass to Oklahoma as part of its public trust
lands. Id. at 591. The Court stated that navigability in fact and in law did not exist where
"the river is not susceptible of being used in its natural and ordinary condition as a highway
for commerce." Id. at 587.
238. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
239. Id. at 57. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
and state law issues concerning the public trust doctrine.
240. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26. In summarizing its opinion, the Shively Court reaffirmed this
principle, stating that "[t]he title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below
high water mark... are governed by the laws of the several States, subject to the rights
granted to the United States by the Constitution." Id. at 57-58.
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as the Court recognized in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.241 In
determining whether Mississippi held title to the lands at issue in Phil-
lips, and thus whether Mississippi could include these lands within the
public trust, the Court not only had to consider its own cases that dis-
cussed the public trust, but also had to consider two other sources: (1)
the common law of the thirteen original states, to determine whether
Mississippi would be entitled to these lands under the equal footing doc-
trine; and (2) the common law of Mississippi, to determine whether Mis-
sissippi had already claimed such lands as within its public trust
dominion.242
1. The common law of the thirteen original states
Pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, new states received title to
certain of their lands, and received additional rights upon gaining state-
hood equivalent to those held by the original thirteen states.243 Since
state common law dictated the limits of lands placed within the public
trust,2' a discussion of the common law of the original thirteen states is
relevant to understanding how the public trust doctrine has been ap-
plied.24 The Phillips Court discussed cases from some of these states to
justify its holding.246 However, as the Phillips Court recognized, where
the common law of a state has severely limited state control over public
trust lands, such as in Massachusetts, this law cannot be forced upon
states which have exercised greater control over their lands.247
Contrary to the Phillips Court's view, 248 the cases it discussed did
241. 108 S. Ct. 791, 794 (1988). As the Phillips Court reaffirmed, "the individual States
have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private
rights in such lands as they see fit." Id. (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
242. Id. at 794-95, 798-99.
243. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal footing
doctrine.
244. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)); see also
supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
245. A full discussion of the common law of each of the states is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a complete discussion of the common law of each state, see Appendix to Petitioner's
Reply Brief, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870); Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Original Thirteen States in Support of Respondents, Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870).
246. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95, 798-99.
247. Id. at 794-95. Massachusetts cases have recognized that "little creeks into which the
salt water flows, but which are incapable of being navigated at all," may be privately owned.
Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 186 (1822). Massachusetts case law
also discussed navigability, determining that "not every ditch, in which the salt water ebbs and
flows," was navigable for purposes of the public trust doctrine. Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corp.,
38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344, 347 (1838).
248. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95, 798-99.
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not suggest as extensive an application of the public trust doctrine as
reached by the Court. For example, state courts have held that the pub-
lic trust includes tidal flats adjacent to an arm of the sea,24 9 salt marshes
adjacent to navigable water,25° and navigable fresh-water lakes.2 1 One
court did describe the test for determining public waters as "[w]aters in
which the tide ebbs and flows-so far only as the sea flows and
reflows. ' ' 25 2 However, none of the above decisions concerned discrete,
non-navigable tidal waters such as those at issue in Phillips,2 3 and the
decisions did not reach as extensively as the Phillips decision.2 4 Thus
the states, which historically have not included remote non-navigable
tidelands within the public trust, are now, after Phillips decided that
states have title to these areas, free to greatly expand their public trusts
beyond the reach their courts have previously contemplated.
2. The common law of Mississippi
The Phillips Court determined that its holding was consistent with
the common law of Mississippi, which "appear[ed] to have consistently
held that the public trust in lands under water includ[ed] 'title to all the
land under tidewater.' "25 However, the Mississippi cases upon which
the Court relied do not have such extensive holdings. For example,
Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs256 concerned a salt marsh, which the court held
to be public trust land because the marsh was alongside a navigable
river.2 " In Treuting v. Bridge and Park Commission,2" 8 the court held
that submerged lands affected by the tide, on the shores of an island in
249. Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346, 352-53 (1856).
250. State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484, 507-09 (1885).
251. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 377 (1867).
252. Id. at 378. The court stated that waters not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide
were private waters, such as the waters in this case. Id.
253. Philips, 108 S. Ct. at 793; see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
254. The majority did not discuss more recent New Jersey decisions that have extended the
physical reach of the public trust doctrine, although these decisions did not discuss discrete,
non-navigable tidelands. See, eg., Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d
47 (1972); O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); see also infra notes
293-301 and accompanying text.
The dissent expressed its fear that the test adopted by the majority would apply the public
trust to any land affected by tidal water, even though the tidal influence was indirect, or the
tidal water remote from any navigable water. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); see supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. See supra note 237 and accompanying
text for the "toothpick" test of navigability described by the Mississippi Supreme Court.
255. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798 (quoting Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704, 713, 146
So. 291, 291-92 (1933)).
256. 166 Miss. 704, 146 So. 291 (1933).
257. Id. at 712-13, 146 So. at 291-92.
258. 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
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the navigable Mississippi Sound, were within the scope of the public trust
because the land was on the edge of navigable water.25 9 In Downes v.
Crosby Chemicals, Inc.,2" the court stated that the test of navigability in
determining the scope of the public trust was navigability in fact in find-
ing that a fresh-water creek was non-navigable and therefore, privately
owned.261 In State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart,262 the court held that Bayou
Bernard, a navigable tidal arm of the Mississippi Sound, was within the
public trust because the waterway itself was navigable.263
In its decisions concerning non-tidal waters, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has clearly held that only waters that are navigable are
included in the public trust.2 4 Concerning tidal waters, the court has
applied the public trust doctrine only to navigable tidal waters.265 The
court has also applied the doctrine to non-navigable tidal waters that
were on the shore of or adjacent to navigable tidal waters.266 The court
has also stated that its decisions were consistent with decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.2 67 In addition, the court conceded
that in the Phillips case it was confronting the question of the public trust
doctrine's application to discrete, non-navigable tidelands for the first
time.
268
The Phillips Court's view of Mississippi's common law was superfi-
cial.269 In review of that law, the only Mississippi case that clearly held
that the public trust included all lands affected by the tide irrespective of
navigability was Phillips.270 Thus, the Phillips Court mistakenly con-
cluded that Mississippi law consistently held that lands such as those
concerned in Phillips were clearly within the public trust, and that the
state had always claimed title to such lands,271 when in fact Mississippi's
259. Id. at 629, 632-33.
260. 234 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1970).
261. Id. at 918-19. No mention was made in this opinion as to the existence of any other
test except a navigability-in-fact test.
262. 184 Miss. 202, 184 So. 44 (1938).
263. Id. at 228-31, 184 So. at 49-50. In this case, the court stated that Mississippi had
effectively adopted the common law of England, and therefore held title to the soils underlying
navigable waters and their shores, up to high-water mark. Id. at 224, 184 So. at 47.
264. Downes, 234 So. 2d at 918-19.
265. State ax rel Rice, 184 Miss. at 224-25, 184 So. at 47-48.
266. Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 629, 632-33.
267. State ex reL Rice, 184 Miss. at 228-29, 184 So. at 49 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1 (1894)).
268. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 516 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nor.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
269. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
270. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 516.
271. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 798.
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law had not reached such a conclusion.
D. Effects On Reasonable Property Expectations
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,2 72 the Court supported its
conclusion by stating that to hold otherwise would upset the reasonable
expectations of property owners.a73 The Court was "skeptical" that its
decision "[would] have sweeping implications, either within Mississippi
or [in other states]."'2 74 However, as has been shown, none of the Court's
prior decisions held that states received title to discrete, non-navigable
tidelands. Moreover, the precedent upon which the Phillips Court relied
were almost all a century old;275 not until the 1960s and 1970s had the
public trust doctrine revived to the level it enjoyed in the nineteenth cen-
tury.2 76 As the dissent recognized, the now rejuvenated ebb and flow test
"will include in the public trust every body of water that is intercon-
nected to the ocean, even indirectly, no matter how remote it is from
navigable water. '277 Thus, not only could record-title holders be dispos-
sessed from lands they thought were theirs, but states would now be en-
couraged to expand the scope of their own public trusts because the
Supreme Court has recognized that states have title to a greater area than
previously.
278
The effects of a finding that states hold title to and that certain lands
are within the public trust-especially lands such as in Phillips that had
not previously been held to be within the scope of the trust-would be
felt most readily by those property owners unaware that the land con-
veyed to them was within the trust.279 This seems especially unjust when
many years have passed without the state claiming title or exercising au-
thority over the lands.280 As pointed out by the dissent in Phillips, Mis-
sissippi did not claim title to or exercise any public trust authority over
272. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
273. Id. at 799.
274. Id. at 798.
275. See, eg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
276. Jiampol, supra note 1, at 4-5; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 643-44.
277. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). States already have an incentive to include as
much land as possible within their public trusts, since a holding that particular property is
within the public trust avoids a takings issue; thus the state would not have to compensate the
"owner." Berland, Toward the True Meaning of the Public Trust, I SEA GRANT L.J. 83, 135
(1976); see also Lazarus, supra note 2, at 648 (public trust doctrine can be used to achieve
"natural resources goals" without "problems of unconstitutional takings").
279. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the lands until 150 years after statehood.2 ' Some of the effects on a
property owner's expectations resulting from such non-action by a state
are illustrated in the following examples from New Jersey and California.
1. The New Jersey example
One fear of the dissent in Phillips, that recognizing greater areas of
state title and expanding the scope of the public trust doctrine would
upset property expectations,282 was already realized in New Jersey prior
to Phillips.28 3 In the early public trust case of Arnold v. Mundy,284 the
New Jersey Supreme Court (then the Court of Errors and Appeals) held
that navigable waters influenced by the tide were within the public
trust.285 In Gough v. Bell,286 the court applied the public trust doctrine
to tidelands at the shore of navigable waters.28 7 These two cases were
typical applications of the public trust doctrine by the New Jersey courts
through the 1950s: courts applied the public trust doctrine to tidelands
at the boundaries of navigable waterways and the seashore.288
However, in 1959, the State of New Jersey began to use the public
trust doctrine to assert title to marshes and meadows, areas affected by
the tides but clearly not navigable because of heavy vegetation. 289 Many
properties were taken by the state without compensating the record own-
ers or lienholders.290 This resulted in much litigation over title to the
lands which the state claimed and confiscated.2 91 As a result, titleholders
suddenly found themselves divested of the property which they had
thought they owned.29 2
Similarly, the expectations of property owners were upset after
281. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority resolved this issue by pointing out that
since Mississippi law did not allow equitable doctrines to be applied against the state, Missis-
sippi could not lose its title to public trust lands by any delay in action. Id. at 799.
282. Id. at 803-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. See, eg., Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972); O'Neill
v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); see also infra notes 293-301 and
accompanying text.
284. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); see also supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
285. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77. The focus of Arnold, as in other early public trust cases, was
on navigable tidal waters. Id.; see also supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
286. 21 N.J.L. 156 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1847).
287. Id. at 160. The Gough decision allowed owners of land above the high-water mark to
construct improvements, such as wharves, in the tidelands as long as they did not interfere
with navigation. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 84, at 840.
288. Porro & Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL L.
REv. 323, 325 (1972).
289. Id. These areas were also not adjacent to any watercourses. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 325-26.
1353
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
O'Neill v. State Highway Department.293 The O'Neill case involved tide-
lands along the Hackensack River, which the New Jersey Supreme Court
held were within the public trust.294 However, the tidelands were no
longer affected by the tide because they had been developed for residen-
tial housing.295 Unaware that their homes rested on former tidelands, 296
the residents who had purchased these homes were shocked by the
court's decision that New Jersey had public trust title.297 Nevertheless,
the court held that the state was not required to exercise authority over
lands or give notice to the alleged owners in order to exercise dominion
pursuant to the public trust.
298
New Jersey courts have expanded the public trust doctrine in other
ways as well. For example, in Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea,299 the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine which pro-
tects public rights in seashores also protects the public's right of access to
those public trust lands.3"° Thus, the court extended the public trust
doctrine to beaches above the high-tide line under the justification that
public trust purposes included recreation, the scope of which encom-
passed beaches.3"' The importance of this case was that the court used
the public trust doctrine to permit the state to control land above the
high-tide line, albeit adjacent to the seashore.
2. California: the recent resurgence of the public trust doctrine
Eldridge v. Cowell, 10 2 one of the earliest public trust doctrine cases
in California, decided in 1854, involved grants to private individuals of
tidelands along San Francisco Harbor.3 "3 The Eldridge court held that
the state could convey tidelands to private owners free of the public trust,
where such grants were for the general good." The court also stated
293. 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967).
294. Id. at 320, 235 A.2d at 8.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Comment, supra note 84, at 845.
298. O'Neill, 50 N.J. at 326-27, 235 A.2d at 11; see also Comment, supra note 84, at 845.
299. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
300. Id. at 304, 294 A.2d at 54.
301. Id. at 303-04, 294 A.2d at 54-55. In holding that the public trust doctrine encom-
passed beaches, the court struck down an Avon-By-The-Sea law which discriminated against
outside residents as to the fees charged for beach access. Id.; see Jafl'ee, The Public Trust
Doctrine Is Alive and Kicking in New Jersey Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea-
a Case of Happy Atavism?, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309, 310 (1974).
302. 4 Cal. 80 (1854). See Jampol, supra note 1, for a complete discussion of the develop-
ment of the public trust doctrine in California law.
303. Eldridge, 4 Cal. at 87.
304. Id.; see also Jampol, supra note I, at 30.
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that such grants could be made where there would be no material inter-
ference with navigation resulting from the grant.30 5
By 1913, the California Supreme Court no longer upheld the El-
dridge principles,3 6 as shown by its decision in People v. California Fish
Co. 307 In California Fish, the dispute involved tidelands in and adjacent
to the navigable waters of San Pedro Bay.308 The California Supreme
Court held that these tidelands were part of the public trust, and invali-
dated grants of the tidelands from the state to private individuals.
30 9
Subsequent to California Fish, up to 1970, there were few cases de-
cided that involved the public trust doctrine.310 However, the California
Supreme Court reinvigorated the doctrine in the 1971 decision of Marks
v. Whitney.3 1 ' In Marks, the court stated that the public trust doctrine
encompassed many flexible uses, including: fishing, hunting, bathing,
swimming, boating, anchoring, and standing, among others.312 The
court held that the tidelands between the high- and low-tide lines adja-
cent to Tomales Bay, a navigable body of water, were within the public
trust.31 3 The Marks decision has been described as a "major expansion
of permissible trust uses," and as an affirmation of absolute state control
over tidelands.
314
California decisions regarding the public trust doctrine have applied
the doctrine to those tidelands between high- and low-tide lines and adja-
cent to navigable waters. 315 The effect of the Phillips decision in Califor-
nia would be to allow further expansion of the public trust doctrine.
California law has already expanded the permissible uses of the public
trust doctrine; now, pursuant to Phillips, the state will be able to apply
305. Eldridge, 4 Cal. at 87-88.
306. Jampol, supra note 1, at 49.
307. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). California Fish has been described as a landmark case
in California public trust law. Jampol, supra note 1, at 5.
308. California Fish, 166 Cal. at 582, 138 P. at 81. The court referred to the tidelands in
controversy as only involving "the land lying between the ordinary high and low tide lines."
Id. at 583, 138 P. at 82.
309. Id. at 596-99, 138 P. at 87-89.
310. Jampol, supra note 1, at 5 & nn.11-12.
311. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
312. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
313. Id. at 258-59, 491 P.2d at 379-80, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96.
314. Jampol, supra note 1, at 12.
315. See, eg., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal.
576, 138 P. 79 (1913); City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 50 P. 277
(1897).
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these public trust uses to a much larger geographical area. 16
E. Proposals For Applying the Public Trust Doctrine
Subsequent to Phillips
1. States should not expand the doctrine by use of
the ebb and flow test
As a result of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,317 states will be
encouraged to expand the public trust to include lands never previously
included.31 However, as to future disputes involving discrete, non-navi-
gable tidelands such as those at issue in Phillips, courts should refrain
from following the reasoning of the Phillips Court because the analysis
disregards over 150 years of precedent which recognized that states held
title only to navigable waters and their non-navigable shores.319 The ebb
and flow rule is a bright line rule which could provide certainty to future
property owners, who would be forewarned that any grant of land under
tidal water would be subject to the public trust. However, the prospect
of future certainty ignores the current disruption of settled property ex-
pectations, and the likely increase in litigation over this issue. Thus,
courts should avoid expanding the public trust doctrine based on the
Phillips Court's reasoning.
2. States should cautiously expand the purposes of the public trust
doctrine, not its physical reach
The Phillips Court recognized that some courts have extended the
public trust doctrine by expanding the purposes for which public trust
lands can be used beyond the traditional uses of navigation, commerce
and fishing.320 The Court noted that it has upheld past decisions that
have included tidal lands within the public trust for other purposes, such
316. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 795. Other jurisdictions will do so as well. See Yiannopoulos,
Five Babes Lost In the Tide-A Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 62 TUL. L. Rnv. 1357 (1988), for a discussion of the effects of the Phillips decision
on Louisiana law. But see Note, supra note 38 for a discussion of the public trust doctrine in
Washington law and the author's viewpoint that the Phillips case will not have detrimental
effects.
317. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
318. States have attempted to assert the public trust doctrine as broadly as possible, because
the state can thus avoid any issues of taking without just compensation. See supra note 278.
319. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Treuting v.
Bridge and Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967); Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss.
704, 146 So. 192 (1933); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
320. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 795.
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as urban expansion.321 Indeed, the Phillips Court affirmed the principle
that state courts may develop their own limits on the scope of the public
trust doctrine.322 However, the Court did not even discuss the purpose
behind Mississippi's exercise of authority over the lands in question, and
did not address whether the state even had a purpose in this case. There-
fore, the Phillips decision should not be read as a green light for states to
haphazardly expand the scope of the doctrine's purposes.323
The Phillips decision nonetheless should not bar a state from cau-
tiously expanding the purposes of the public trust doctrine to exercise
control over its lands that were traditionally recognized as state-owned.
As with other public trust decisions, cases that have expanded the pur-
poses have involved tidelands on the shore of navigable waters.324 Due
to modem concerns regarding the environment, conserving natural re-
sources, and excessive urban development in coastal areas, states may
desire to exercise increasing control over their public trust lands. Some
courts, however, have gone beyond increasing the number of purposes
for which the doctrine should be applied; they have actually increased
the physical scope of the doctrine to include, for example, lands even
above the high-tide line.325 States should not expand the physical scope
of the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional reach solely because of
current public concers, even though Phillips recognized the existence of
state title to a greater extent than before. Such action contains the same
potential of upsetting settled property expectations that can result from
the Phillips decision.326
3. The navigability-in-fact test: the best solution
As stated by the dissent in Phillips, no good reason exists supporting
different tests to determine state title, and for delineating the scope of the
public trust doctrine as applied to fresh water and salt water.327 Naviga-
bility should be the sole test of public trust lands.
321. Id.; see supra note 155.
322. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95, 798-99; see supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
323. One author has described the public trust's purpose merely as a navigational servitude,
only applicable where the waters in question were navigable. See Jampol, supra note 1, at 83.
324. For example, the California case of Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971), involved tidelands on the shores of Tomales Bay, a navigable body of
water. Marks enumerated a broad list of appropriate public trust purposes, including: bath-
ing, swimming, boating, recreation, preserving lands in their natural state for scientific study,
and providing habitats for birds and marine life. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
at 796.
325. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
327. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1357
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The advantages to a navigability test are clear. The ebb and flow
test seems to be a bright line rule, and in theory would be easily applica-
ble. Practically, however, the ebb and flow test would engender disputes
between states and private parties over lands not previously included in
the public trust. In contrast, applying a navigability test would involve
lands that have long been used for navigation and other public trust pur-
poses, and would not disrupt settled expectations of private landowners.
Additionally, navigability has been used as the test according to prece-
dent; navigability imparts a settled degree of certainty in judicial applica-
tion.328 Thus, the most practical, as well as equitable, application of the
public trust doctrine is only as to those waters that are navigable and to
their shores, irrespective of whether the waters are fresh or tidally
influenced.
V. CONCLUSION
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,3 29 the Supreme Court of the
United States recognized greater boundaries of state title, and extended
the reach of the public trust doctrine to unprecedented bounds. The
Court held that states have title to all their tidelands-whether discrete,
non-navigable waters remote from any navigable waters, or non-naviga-
ble waters adjacent to navigable waters-and therefore that these lands
were within the scope of the public trust.330 The decision exceeded the
boundaries of state-owned land as described in federal common law, and
exceeded the scope of the traditional public trust doctrine as described in
state common law by creating a bright-line rule-using the ebb and flow
test-that states hold title to all land under water affected by the tide,
abandoning any need for distinction between navigable and non-naviga-
ble waters in tidal areas.331
Phillips provides a potential for great upset of settled expectations in
property rights; with the Court's strong affirmation of a blanket tidal test,
states have received encouragement to exercise their public trust powers
in tidal areas that the Court recognized they now own. This potential
would not now exist had the Court followed the more logical common-
law navigability-in-fact test to determine to which lands the state held
title.
Although Phillips held that states have title to all non-navigable
tidelands, states remain free to determine whether or not they will actu-
328. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
329. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
330. Id. at 795.
331. See supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
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ally apply the public trust doctrine to these lands.3 32 States should re-
frain from using the ebb and flow test to expand the physical reach of
their public trusts. Instead, states desiring to expand the scope of their
trusts should consider the purposes of the trusts, and balance public in-
terests with the effects on private interests before expanding their trusts.
The best application of the public trust doctrine would be to continue the
use of a navigability-in-fact test-to all waters, not just fresh waters.
This would be consistent with past application of the public trust doc-
trine and equitable to private landowners.
Donna A. Golem*
332. Phillips, 108 S. Ct. at 794-95. The Court stated that its holding would not affect the
scope of the public trust doctrine in other states, including those states which had recognized
private rights in discrete, non-navigable waters, unburdened by a public trust. Id.; see also
supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
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